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IMPERFECT SELF-DEFENSE
I. THE TRADITIONAL RULE
At common law two classes of homicide were excusable: homi-
cide per infortunium, or by misadventure; and homicide se de-
fendeudo, or in self-defense. In the early common law, one who
committed excusable homicide was, upon such a finding by the
jury, remitted to prison in the custody of the sheriff to wait for
pardon from the king., Today, excusable homicide is a ground
for acquittal by the jury.
The elements of homicide se defendendo have been stated as
follows: "To render a homicide justifiable or excusable on the
ground of self-defense- (1) It must reasonably appear that there
is imminent danger of death, or of some other felony, or of great
bodily harm... (2) In the case of excusable self-defense, in a
sudden affray, the party threatened must retreat as far as he
can with safety before taking his adversary's life... (3) The
slayer must not have been the aggressor, or otherwise have pro-
voked the difficulty." 2 Many states adhere strictly to the doctrine
that an aggressor cannot rely upon self-defense, notwithstanding
the possibility that his intent at the time of provoking the diffi-
culty may not have been felonious, unless he clearly withdraws
from the conflict and is thereafter forced to kill the deceased in
order to save his own life or to protect himself from serious bod-
ily injury.3 The courts of the following states have adopted this
rule: Arizona, 4 Oklahoma,' California,6 Kansas,7 New Jersey,8
Ohio,9 Rhode Island,0 Indiana,1 Pennsylvania,12 and Iowa. 13 The
I Fitzh. Abr. Corone, pl. 284, Anonymous Case, Northampton Eyre
(1329); Translation in 3 Stephen, "History of Crim. Law", 38; also in
Sayre, "Cases on Criminal Law" p. 600. See also 4 Blackstone Com. 188,
1 East, P. C. 279, and 1 Hale, P. C. 425, 482.
2 Clark and Marshall, "Crimes" (3rd ed.), p. 347. (Italics are mine.)
3 Russell, "Crimes and Punishments" (8th ed.), p. 769-773. Kerr, "Law
of Homicide", p. 201. 1 Bishop, "Criminal Law" (9th ed.), p. 603.
4 Micias v. State (Arizona S. Ct. 1932) 6 Pac. (2nd) 423.
5 Gross v. State (Okla. Cr. App. 1931) 297 Pac. 309.
6 People v. Bush, (1884) 65 Cal. 129, 3 Pac. 590. People v. Finali, (1916)
31 Cal. App. 479, 160 Pac. 850. People v. Hoover, (Cal. App. 1930) 290
Pac. 493.
7State v. Schroeder, (1918) 103 Kan. 770, 176 Pac. 659.8 State v. Agnesi, (1919) 92 N. J. Law 53, 104 Atl. 299; affirmed in 92
N. J. Law 638, 106 Atl. 299.
9 State v. Morgan, (1919) 100 0. St. 66, 125 N. E. 109.
10 State v. Ballou, (1898) 20 R. I. 607, 40 Atl. 861.
11 Story v. State, (1885) 99 Ind. 413.
2 Logue v. Com. (1861) 38 Pa. 265.
Is State v. Benham, (1867) 23 Ia. 1. c. 162, 92 Am. Dec. 416. State v.
Murdy, (1891) 81 Ia. 614, 47 N. W. 867. State v. McCaskill, (1913) 160
Ia. 554, 142 N. W. 445.
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basis for such a rule is that the defendant, having produced or
provoked the situation necessitating the killing, is held responsi-
ble for the results thereof and is therefore deprived of the right
to rely upon self-defense. The kinds of provocation arising in
these cases will be treated later.
II. THE MISSOURI DOCTRINE OF IMPERFECT SELF-DEFENSE
Of the several variations from the rule just stated the doctrine
of imperfect self-defense is the most widely accepted. Although
the earlier Missouri cases clung to the traditional view,1" in 1884
the Supreme Court began to shift its position. In State v. Cullere
the defendant, convicted of murder in the second degree, alleged
error in an instruction which deprived him of self-defense if the
jury found him to have been the aggressor. The court sustained
his objection, pointing out that "it is only when the wordy quar-
rel or the actual non-felonious combat is provoked by the com-
mencer or aggressor in order to afford opportunity for him to
kill his adversary, that the right of self-defense ceases." But in
this case the court failed to clarify its choice of one of two pos-
sible positions, namely: when under such circumstances, the de-
sible positions, namely: when under such circumstances the de-
fendant has established self-defense should he receive an acquit-
lesser penalty?
Three years later, however, the court adopted the latter posi-
tion. In State v. Partow"1 the defendant, likewise convicted of
murder, took exception to an instruction similar to that given in
State v. Culler and, in addition, alleged error in the refusal of
the trial court to grant certain instructions, one of which was to
the effect that before the jury can refuse to allow the defendant
the plea of self-defense, they must believe from the evidence that
the defendant provoked or voluntarily entered the fight with a
felonious intent to maim, wound, hurt, or kill the deceased. The
most unfavorable evidence against the accused tended to show
that he had provoked the quarrel by calling the deceased a liar.
In sustaining these contentions of the defendant, the court
adopted the rule as stated in the prior Texas case of Reed v.
State,7 holding that there are two types of self-defense in the
law of homicide: perfect, and imperfect self-defense. The ac-
cused may rely upon the former only when he acted from neces-
sity in killing his adversary and was wholly free from producing
the occasion from which such necessity arose. However, if the
defendant himself was in the wrong and, as a result was placed
14 State v. Hays (1856) 23 Mo. 287. State v. Starr (1866) 38 Mo. 270.
State v. Linney (1873) 52 Mo. 40. State v. Underwood (1874) 57 Mo. 40.
State v. Peak (1884) 85 Mo. 193.
15 (1884) 82 Mo. 623.
1 (1887) 90 Mo. 608, 4 S. W. 14.
17 (1882) 11 Tex. App. 509.
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in a situation necessitating the killing, the law limits his right
of self-defense according to the magnitude of ljis wrong, which
in turn, is measured by his intent in provokihig the difficulty.
This ruling has been adopted by the United States Supreme
Court,18 and by the courts in Nevada,"9 North Carolina,20 New
York,'2 1 Virginia, 2  West Virginia, 23 Tennessee,' 4 Colorado,25 Illi-
nois,'26 and Texas ;27 by dicta it is upheld also in Louisiana 28 and
Michigan. 29 The Texas courts have recently wavered somewhat,
sometimes allowing an acquittal in cases which the Missouri
courts would have reduced only to manslaughter under the im-
perfect self-defense rule.0 There is a division among text writers
as to the validity of the Missouri doctrine.1
Care should be taken not to confuse the Missouri view as to
imperfect self-defense with the rule as to chance medley, where
the parties begin the quarrel and both are apparently at fault;
here the offense is also manslaughter. It is also to be distin-
guished from the doctrine of withdrawal, which allows the de-
fendant perfect self-defense where he provokes the quarrel, with-
draws in good faith and, being pursued by the adversary, kills in
self-defense22
is Wallace v. United States, (1896) 162 U. S. 466, 40 L. Ed. 465.
19 State v. Huber, (1915) 38 Nev. 253, 148 Pac. 562.
20 State v. Dove, (1911), 156 N. C. 653, 72 S. E. 792. State v. Ray, (1914)
166 N. C. 420, 81 S. E. 1087. State v. Crisp (1916) 170 N. C. 785, 87 S. E.
51L
21 People v. Filippelli, (1903) 173 N. Y. 509, 66 N. E. 402.
22 Hash v. Com., (1891) 88 Va. 194, 13 S. E. 405.
22 State v. Taylor, (1905) 57 W. Va. 228, 50 S. E. 247.
24 State v. Foutch, (1896) 95 Tenn. 711, 34 S. W. 423.
25 Boykin v. People, (1896) 22 Colo. 496, 45 Pac. 419.
26Adams v. People, (1868) 47 Ill. 376. Kinney v. People, (1884) 108
InI. 519.
27 Reed v. State, (1882) 11 Tex. App. 509. King v. State, (1882) 13 Tex.
App. 277. Logan v. State, (1884) 17 Tex. App. 50. Meuly v. State, (1888)
26 Tex. App. 561. Blackwell v. State, (1926) 103 Tex. Cr. Rep. 423, 281
S. W. 213. Crowley v. State, (Tex. Cr. App. 1931) 35 S. W. (2nd) 437.
2s State v. Erwin, (1913) 133 La. 550, 63 So. 167. State v. Domingue,
(1928) 166 La. 859, 118 So. 46.
2 People v. Pearl, (1889) 76 Mich. 207, 42 N. W. 1109.
to Roberson v. State (Tex. 1918) 203 S. W. 349.
at The rule is recognized in: Kelley, "Criminal Law and Procedure" (4th
ed.), par. 531; 1 Bishop "Criminal Law" (9th ed.), p. 603; Clark and
Marshall (3rd ed.), "Crimes", par. 282; Sherwood, "Commentaries on
Criminal Law", p. 52; Horrigan and Thompson, "Cases on Self-defense",
p. 227n.; and in Wharton, "Criminal Law" (12th ed.), par. 615. The
traditional view is adopted in Russell, "Crimes and Punishments" (8th ed.),
p. 769-773; Gilbert, "Criminal Code and Penal Law", p. 371; and Michie,
"Homicide", p. 342.
"2 Rowe v. United States, (1896) 164 U. S. 546, 41 L. Ed. 547, 17 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 172.
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III. RATIONALE OF IMPERFECT SELF-DEFENSE
Of the scores of cases adopting the Missouri rule, few give
arguments in its support; the majority of courts evidently are
content to cite the minority holdings and to ignore the weight of
authority contra. The Texas court in Reed v. State appears to
contain the first attempt to support the doctrine by argument. In
this case the trial court instructed that if deceased found his wife
in the act of adultery with the defendant, and the deceased "then
and there made an attack on defendant, defendant had no right
to resist such attack, and an attack made upon defendant under
such circumstances does not come within the definition of self-
defense." In the opinion, the court assumed that this instruction
was based on what was then Article 567 of the state penal code,
which read, "... homicide is justifiable when committed by the
husband upon the person of anyone taken in the act of adultery
with the wife, provided the killing take place before the parties
to the act of adultery have separated." The conviction of murder
was reversed, the upper court declaring that the instruction given
was erroneous because it predicated the defendant's guilt upon
what would have been the law had the deceased killed the defen-
dant, including: "The accused is always guilty or innocent from
his own standpoint, that is, his personal, individual acts with rela-
tion to the matter charged." Instead of instructing the lower
court to apply the rule convicting the defendant of voluntary
manslaughter when killing is committed under such provocation
as would arouse in a reasonable person a heat of passion,33 the
court stated that the case warranted application of the doctrine
of imperfect self-defense, taking the stand which the Missouri
Supreme Court later took in the Partlow Case. The court then
attempted to reconcile its view with the earlier cases by saying
that they held that "if the individual assaulted, being himself
without fault, reasonably apprehends death or serious bodily
harm to himself unless he kills the assailant, the killing is justi-
fiable.. 34 But a person cannot avail himself of a necessity which
he has knowingly and wilfully brought upon himself... That is,
it (referring to the necessity) will not afford him a justification
in law." The court attempted to reason that although the older
cases did preclude giving the defendant justification for the
crime, they did not necessarily preclude giving him a partial ex-
cuse. In criticism, it must be said that while in the early common
law there was a sharp distinction between justifiable and excus-
able homicide,85 homicide in self-defense being excusable and not
justifiable, modern courts often use the terms interchangeably.
The Texas court, therefore, resurrected this distinction without
33 Manning's Case, (K.B. 1671) T. Raym. 212; 83 Eng. Rep. 112.
34 1 Bishop "Criminal Law" (9th ed.) par. 865.
35 Clark and Marshall, "Crimes" (3rd ed.), par. 273.
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warrant in modern precedent, and failed to justify its decision
on other grounds.
The reasoning of the Missouri court was likewise feeble. In
the Partlow case our Supreme Court stated the rule that one who
begins a quarrel, or brings on a difficulty, with the felonious pur-
pose of killing the person assaulted, upon accomplishment of
such purpose, is guilty of murder and cannot avail himself of
the doctrine of self-defense; and then strangely went on to assert
that as a logical conclusion it followed that one bringing on a
difficulty without a felonious intent would not be guilty of mur-
der. The court concluded by saying: "To deny this obvious de-
duction is equivalent to the anomalous assertion that there can
be a felony without a felonious intent; that the act done charac-
terizes the intent, and not the intent the act." Later cases reach
similar decisions on this basis.38
Perhaps the only plausible basis for the rule is given by Bishop,
who states: "The person attacked by his unjustified counter-at-
tack has himself become a wrongdoer and has thus conferred
upon his assailant the legal right to resist him to death itself. '37
He should have used the qualified words, "legal right," with
the word, "imperfect", as no courts convict a person of man-
slaughter for doing what he had the legal right to do. Another
basis might well lie in the fact that because the law attempts to
establish the various crimes and their penalties with reference
to the relative degree of anti-social conduct involved, it must
logically make the defendant's crime under the situations in im-
perfect self-defense cases manslaughter rather than murder.
Few persons would assert that a killing without an intent to
commit a killing or to inflict great bodily harm on another is
conduct as anti-social as a killing with such an intent formed at
the beginning of the affray. Possibly this is the explanation for
the trend of American state decisions during the past few de-
cades towards the Missouri rule.
IV. INCIDENTS OF THE DOCTRINE
An examination of incidental questions such as the defendant's
intent, the presumptions, the burden of proof, and reversible
error is of value.
As to the question of intent, the cases may be summarized
thus: 1) if the defendant provoked the difficulty with the intent
to kill, to commit great bodily injury upon the deceased, or to
commit any other felony, he may not rely upon imperfect self-
defense, but 2) if the defendant provoked the difficulty without
an intent to kill, to commit great bodily injury upon the de-
ceased, or to commit any other felony, he may rely upon the
86 Wallace v. United States, (1896) 162 U. S. 466. Hash v. Com., (1891)
88 Va. 194, 13 S. E. 405.
37 1 Bishop "Criminal Law" (9th ed.) p. 603.
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doctrine, provided that the other required elements also are
present.38
As to the burden of proof on the issue of imperfect self-de-
38 The Missouri cases sustain the following propositions with regard to
intent:
1. If the defendant provoked the quarrel with the intent to kill the
deceased, he cannot avail himself of this doctrine. So held in: State v.
Paxton, (1894) 126 Mo. 500, 29 S. W. 705; State v. Gilmore, (1888) 95
Mo. 554, 8 S. W. 359; State v. Lewis, (1893) 118 Mo. 79, 23 S. W. 1083;
and State v. Bailey, (1905) 190 Mo. 257, 88 S. W. 733.
2. If the defendant began the quarrel in order to inflict great bodily
harm on the deceased, the rule does not apply. Held in: State v. Gilmore,
supra; State v. Dunn, (1909) 221 Mo. 530, 120 S. W. 1179.
3. Converse of (2). Held in: State v. Rapp, (1897) 142 Mo. 443, 44
S. W. 270; State v. Hopper, (1897) 142 Mo. 478, 44 S. W. 272; State v.
Patterson, (1900) 159 Mo. 560, 60 S. W. 1047; State v. Gordon, (1905)
191 Mo. 114, 89 S. W. 1025.
4. If the defendant began the quarrel with a felonious intent, he is
deprived of imperfect self-defense. Held in: State v. Partlow, supra
note 16; State v. Berkley, (1887) 92 Mo. 41, 4 S. W. 24; State v. Kretsch-
mar, (1910) 232 Mo. 29, 133 S. W. 16; State v. Painter, (1931) 329 Mo.
314, 44 S. W. (2nd) 79.
5. Converse of (4). Held in: State v. Gamble (1893), 119 Mo. 427;
State v. Partlow, ib.; State v. Berkley, supra; State v. Parker, (1891)
106 Mo. 217, 17 S. W. 180; See Horrigan & Thompson, "Cases on Self-
Defense" p. 227n.
6. Where the defendant in provoking the quarrel did not commit or
attempt to commit a felony, he may be denied the right of imperfect
self-defense. Held in State v. Creed, (1923), 299 Mo. 307, 252 S. W.
678; Dictum in Reed v. State, supra, fn. 17.
7. If the defendant entered into the quarrel with the intent to wreak
or gratify malice he cannot avail himself of this doctrine. Held in: State
v. Feeley, (1906) 194 Mo. 300, 92 S. W. 663; State v. Caldwell (Mo. S.
Ct. (1921) 231 S. W. 613.
8. Converse of (7). Held in: State v. Adler, (1898) 146 Mo. 18, 47
S. W. 794; State v. Hopper, (1898) 142 Mo. 478, 44 S. W. 272; State v.
Goddard, (1898) 146 Mo. 177, 48 S. W. 82.
9. If the defendant's intent was to commit merely an ordinary battery
and the defendant thus provoked the quarrel, the rule is available to
him. Held in: State v. Gamble, (1893) 119 Mo. 427, 24 S. W. 1030; State
v. Eastham, (1912) 240 Mo. 241, 144 S. W. 492.
10. If the defendant sought a renewal of the quarrel using only words
and intending to bluff and over-awe the deceased he may rely upon im-
perfect self-defense. Held in: State v. Roberts, (1920) 280 Mo. 669, 217
S. W. 988.
11. The mere fact that the defendant voluntarily enters or provokes
the difficulty will not deprive him of the rule. Held in: State v. Patter-
son, supra; State v. Hopper, supra; State v. Rapp, id.; State v. Gordon,
supra-these cases all being cited in this note.
12. If the defendant is an accomplice knowing that the co-defendant
sought the deceased for the purpose of merely assaulting and whipping
him, but without a felonious intent to use upon him a deadly weapon or
inflict great bodily injury, and that the defendant accomplice accom-
panied him to the scene for the purpose and with the intent of aiding,
encouraging, or assisting him if necessary, and the co-defendant killed
the deceased to save his own life, the defendant may rely upon the doc-
trine. Held in: State v. Darling, (1907) 202 Mo. 150, 100 S. W. 631.
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fense, there are no cases in point. Probably when such a question
arises the courts will adopt the rule as it is in perfect self-de-
fense, upon which point the Missouri Supreme Court has wav-
ered,3 9 finally reaching its present holding in State V. Malone,
4
in which case the court held an instruction erroneous which
stated that the defendant had the burden of proving his self-de-
fense to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury before he could
be acquitted upon that ground, as the state has the burden of
proving all the issues of the case beyond a reasonable doubt.
It had long been settled in this state that when the defendant
was prosecuted for murder, if the homicide was proved there re-
sulted a presumption of second degree murder, and the defendant
then had the burden of bringing forth evidence mitigating the
crime to manslaughter or giving complete acquittal on justification
or excuse, 41 but later cases apparently limit this presumption to
cases of violent killing or cases in which the defendant used a
deadly weapon with intent to kill, 42 or where the defendant used
a deadly weapon on a vital part of deceased's body.4 3 Some limit
the presumption to cases in which there is established an inten-
tional killing of a human being by another, it being also required
that the defendant use a deadly weapon at a vital part of the
body of the deceased."
A conviction of murder having resulted in a particular case,
when is a failure to embody the doctrine in the instructions re-
versible error? All the cases agree that if there is any evidence
showing that the defendant provoked the quarrel without an in-
tent to kill, to commit serious bodily harm, or to commit a felony,
and that he killed the deceased in self-defense in reasonable fear
of death or great bodily injury at the hand of deceased, the in-
dictment being for murder, the defendant is entitled to an in-
39 State v. Brown, (1877) 64 Mo. 367, the first Missouri case in point,
held that an instruction placing the burden of proof on the state was prop-
erly refused. State v. Hill, (1879) 69 Mo. 451, held that an instruction
putting the burden on the defendant was erroneous for that reason. State
v. Jones, (1883) 78 Mo. 278, held that the defendant must establish self-
defense from the whole evidence to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury,
although the jury should not convict if they have a reasonable doubt as
to his guilt. State v. Roberts, (1920) 294 Mo. 284, 242 S. W. 669, held that
the defendant had the burden of proof.
40 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1933) 62 S. W. (2nd) 909.
41 State v. Gassert, (1877) 65 Mo. 352. State v. Lesterman, (1878) 68
Mo. 408. State v. Philpott, (1912) 242 Mo. 504, 146 S. W. 1160. State v.
Moore, (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1921) 235 S. W. 1056. State v. Henke, (1926) 313
Mo. 615, 285 S. W. 392.
42 State v. Eason, (Mo. S. Ct. 1929) 18 S. W. (2nd) 71. State v. Cook,
(Mo. S. Ct. 1931) 44 S. W. (2nd) 90. State v. Majors, (1931), 329 Mo.
148, 44 S. W. (2nd) 163. State v. Minor, (1906) 193 Mo. 597, 92 S. W. 466.
State v. Evans, (1894) 124 Mo. 397, 28 S. W. 8.
43 State v. Malone, (Mo. S. Ct. 1931) 39 S. W. (2nd) 786.
44 Ex parte Verden, (Mo. S. Ct. 1922) 237 S. W. 735. State v. Snow,
(1922) 293 Mo. 143, 238 S. W. 1069.
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struction on imperfect self-defense. Under such circumstances
a conviction of murder is reversible if the trial court has refused
to grant such an instruction or gives an instruction on self-de-
fense, failing to state the rule of imperfect-self-defense. 4 1 If no
evidence as to self-defense has been introduced at the trial, the
defendant is not entitled to such an instruction.4 Where no evi-
dence has been introduced to show that the defendant provoked
the difficulty which resulted in the homicide, and the evidence
points either to murder or acquittal on self-defense, a refusal
or failure to give an instruction on imperfect self-defense is not
reversible error.47 If no evidence has been introduced to prove
that the defendant's intention was to commit a misdemeanor or
anything less than a felony, an instruction on perfect self-defense
is not reversible error merely because it fails to qualify itself by
stating giving the law as to imperfect self-defense.48 If the de-
fendant provoked the difficulty with a knife, refusal to grant an
instruction on the doctrine is not reversible error, since the evi-
dence conclusively showed that the intent of the defendant in
provoking the difficulty was felonious.49 And, finally, in all cases
in which the defendant was convicted merely of manslaughter,
any error as to imperfect self-defense is not sufficient ground for
a reversal. 0
V. APPLICATION OF IMPERFECT SELF-DEFENSE
The result of application of the Missouri rule to specific cases
as compared with an application of the traditional doctrine to
cases involving the same basic factual circumstances is apparent.
The cases in point may be grouped into two divisions with re-
gard to the type of provocation on the part of the defendant,
namely: (1) mere words, and (2) use of physical force,-the
defendant's intent in neither case being felonious. In each case
the defendant would be convicted of murder under the older view,
but only of manslaughter in the courts adopting the Missouri
rule. In the first division of cases, Macs v. Stat 1 resulted in
45 State v. Gordon, supra, note 38 (3). State v. Adler, (1898) 146 Mo.
18, 47 S. W. 794. State v. Evans, supra, note 42. State v. Vaughan, (1897)
141 Mo. 514, 42 S. W. 1080. State v. Rapp, (1897) 142 Mo. 443, 44 S. W.
270. State v. Hopper, (1897) 142 Mo. 478, 44 S. W. 272. State v. Patter-
son (1900) 159 Mo. 560, 60 S. W. 1047.40 State v. Gilmore, (1888) 95 Mo. 554, 8 S. W. 359.
47 State v. Zorn, (1907) 202 Mo. 12, 100 S. W. 591.
48 State v. Dunn, supra, note 38 (2).
49 State v. Painter, supra, note 38 (4).
50 State v. Dollarhide, (1933) 333 Mo. 1087, 63 S. W. (2nd) 999.
51 (Arizona Sup. Ct., 1931) 6 Pac. (2nd) 423. Other examples are People
v. Hoover, (Cal. App., 1930) 290 Pac. 493; State v. Murdy, (1891) 81 Ia.
1. c. 614, 47 N. W. 867; Barton v. State, (1916) 72 Fla. 408, 73 So. 230;
Kimbrough v. State, (1878) 62 Ala. 248; and Eiland v. State, (1875) 52
Ala. 324. See also State v. Christian, (1877) 66 Mo. 1. c. 144 (before State
v. Partlow).
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a conviction of first degree murder, although the defendant pro-
voked the quarrel with mere words; this case may be compared
with numerous Missouri cases in which the defendant could be
convicted only of manslaughter; as where the defendant called
to the deceased: "You have my still," and requested deceased to
come out of the barn ;52 where the defendant went to deceased's
home, asked for defendant's wife, and replied to deceased's an-
swer: "That's a lie!" ;53 where the defendant began the quarrel
by saying to the deceased: "You have been telling around that I
have been bootlegging whiskey" or "selling whiskey";54 and
where the defendant renewed the quarrel with threatening, bluff-
ing, and menacing words.- In the second division of cases, Leon-
ard v. State56 is typical of the result of application of the older
rule. In this case the accused began the quarrel by hitting de-
ceased with a club; and the court held that there could be no self-
defense in the case as a matter of law as "Such a plea can never
be invoked, or made available by a defendant, unless he be rea-
sonably free from fault in bringing on the difficulty." While this
case resulted in a murder conviction, the defendant was convicted
of only manslaughter in Boykin v. People,57 a case somewhat
similar in facts arising in a jurisdiction following the Missouri
doctrine. Although here the defendant likewise began the diffi-
culty by beating the deceased with a club, the court held that if
the defendant intended to commit only a disdemeanor the ac-
cused could not be completely deprived of self-defense. In the
Missouri case of State v. Easthanm5 8 the defendant's accomplice
helped the defendant provoke the quarrel by striking the de-
ceased and the holding in Boykin v. People was followed. In an-
other Missouri case5" the same result was reached where the prov-
ocation consisted of the defendant putting his hand against the
deceased, bidding him to retire. Thus it is seen that the distinc-
tion made by the judges is actual in fact as well as in legal theory.
VI. OTHER VARIATIONS FROM THE TRADITIONAL RULE
Another variation from the older doctrine is upheld in Flor-
ida ° and Idaho,"' in which jurisdiction the defendant cannot be
52 State v. Rennison, (1924) 306 Mo. 473, 267 S. W. 850.
53 State v. Partlow, supra, note 16.
5 State v. Pennington, (1898) 146 Mo. 27, 47 S. W. 799.
55 State v. Roberts, (1919) 280 Mo. 669, 217 S. W. 998.
56 (1880) 66 Ala. 461; see also Lewis v. State, (1889) 88 Ala. 11, 6 So.
755.
57 (1896) 22 Colo. 496, 45 Pac. 419.
58 (1912) 240 Mo. 241, 144 S. W. 492.
5, State v. Davidson, (1888) 95 Mo. 155, 8 S. W. 413.
60 Lovett v. State, (1892) 30 Fla. 142, 11 So. 550; Ballard v. State, (1893)
31 Fla. 451, 24 So. 145; Padgett v. State, (1898) 40 Fla. 451, 24 So. 145;
Gaff v. State, (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1931) 138 So. 48; Bowman v. State, (Fla. Sup.
Ct. 1934) 152 So. 739.
81 State v. Fox, (Idaho Sup. Ct. 1933) 16 Pac. (2nd) 663.
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deprived of self-defense if only he be reasonably free from fault
in provoking the difficulty. This distinction is for practical pur-
poses unimportant except in a few cases, 2 as only rarely would
the defendant be reasonably free from fault and yet not com-
pletely without fault in bringing on the difficulty.
The Mississippi courts apparently are more liberal to the de-
fendant than jurisdictions following the Missouri Supreme Court.
In Smith v. State, ' the court reversed a conviction of murder
upon an improper refusal of the trial court to give an instruction
requested that insulting words were not sufficient provocation to
deprive the defendant of self-defense. This case is similar to the
Missouri case of State v. Culler"4 in that the court failed to state
whether in such a situation the defendant would be entitled to
rely upon perfect or imperfect self-defense. Dicta in other Miss-
issippi cases lean toward the former.0 5
JAMES C. LOGAN, '36.
"PUBLIC USE" IN FEDERAL EMINENT DOMAIN
Numerous projects contemplated or actually initiated by the
present Administration require the use of the federal power of
condemnation. Especially significant at the moment is the bill
now before Congress appropriating some four billion dollars to
be used by the President in various ways for relief against the
effects of the depression, and authorizing him to acquire any real
or personal property or any interest therein by the power of
eminent domain.' It is the purpose of this discussion to examine
the extent to which the United States Government, as distin-
guished from the States, can thus take private property, aside
from questions of procedure and just compensation, as evidenced
by the types of cases in which the power has been exercised in
the past, and the principles established therein. In considering
the problem it is well to remember that the power to condemn,
practically if not theoretically, rises from the power to appropri-
ate for the general welfare, and that the questions which arise
in considering the validity of acts of either type are basically
analogous.
For nearly a hundred years after the adoption of the Con-
stitution it was considered doubtful by both writers and states-
6? McBryde v. State, (1908) 156 Ala. 44, 47 So. 302. Brewer v. State,
(1909) 160 Ala. 66, 49 So. 336.6S (1898) 75 Miss. 542, 23 So. 260.
64 Supra, note 15.
Or Prine v. State, (1896) 73 Miss. 838, 19 So. 711; Lofton v. State, (1902)
79 Miss. 732, 31 So. 420; Rogers v. State, (1903) 82 Miss. 479, 34 So. 320;
Lucas v. State, (1915) 109 Miss. 82, 67 So. 851. See also Brown v. State,
(1877) 58 Ga. 212.
' H. J. Res. 117.
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